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Strategy is central to politics. Wars, elections, treaties, negotiations, and other outcomes we substantively care about depend on on the strategies that actors adopt to pursue their interests. Strategy is also one of the few political science concepts with widespread utility out-
side of the classroom. Students who grasp what it means to act, 
compete, and cooperate strategically will have a decisive edge in 
the war room, boardroom, or courtroom.
Unfortunately, teachers who want to expose students to this 
critical way of thinking have few eﬀ ective tools at their disposal. 
This is especially true at the undergraduate level. From Clausewitz 
to Schelling, the canonical literature on strategy centers on abstract 
concepts and game-theoretic principles that are diﬃ  cult for students 
to grasp. Even contemporary national-security strategy documents 
are a poor model for how to think strategically. Rather than focusing 
on dynamic tactics, they tend to read like “laundry lists” of goals and 
objectives. This overlooks the most important aspect of any strate-
gic interaction: that is, the other side also has a say in the outcome.
Crisis simulations provide a better pedagogical tool for teaching 
students about strategy, strategic interactions, and strategic compe-
tition. Studies suggest that simulation exercises improve learning 
outcomes by grounding abstract concepts in concrete experience 
and allowing students to gain understanding of them through both 
active experimentation and problem solving.1 Moreover, unlike 
lectures and small-group discussions, simulations can be purpose-
fully designed to induce real strategic interaction.
In 2011, in an eﬀ ort to teach strategic thinking, the Center for 
International Security Studies (CISS) at Princeton University–as 
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part of its broader Strategic Education Initiative (SEI)–designed an 
adaptable model for crisis simulation that could be used in a vari-
ety of institutional contexts and with diverse content matter.2 The 
simulation helps students to develop a conceptual understanding 
of several important abstract concepts in political science: notably, 
information uncertainty, friction or “the fog of war,” and bureau-
cratic pathologies such as stove piping.
This article describes the design, content, and implementation 
of our original simulation, which was based on a scenario of missing 
nuclear material resulting from the collapse of the Pakistani state. 
We conclude by evaluating the beneﬁ ts and limitations of the simu-
lation and by suggesting ways in which it could be implemented in 
other institutional contexts. 
LEARNING OBJECTIVES AND CORRESPONDING DESIGN 
ELEMENTS
Our primary goal was to construct a simulation that forced par-
ticipants to compete and cooperate strategically. Beyond setting 
objectives, we wanted players to pursue their interests by develop-
ing plans and taking actions while coping with the dynamically 
changing tactics of other players, who were simultaneously pursu-
ing their own discrete interests. In other words, we wanted players 
to interact with one another rather than “gaming” the rules of the 
simulation, which happens all too often when clear point systems 
or pay-oﬀ  structures are adopted. Instead, the simulation is cen-
tered on a volunteer “control cell” that is charged with managing 
the game ﬂ ow, enforcing rules, adjudicating moves, and control-
ling the states and actors not represented by the country teams. Of 
particular importance, the control cell began with a clear plan for 
how a terrorist organization would try to remove captured nuclear 
warheads from Pakistan (with several contingency plans), which 
allowed for ﬂ exible diﬃ  culty in “solving” the game. This design 
had the additional beneﬁ t of helping students to develop a 
conceptual understanding of the “fog of war” by permitting the 
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control team to inject uncertainty and unexpected events through-
out the simulation.
A secondary objective was to introduce students to the chal-
lenges of bureaucratic politics and diplomacy that are also diﬃ  cult 
to grasp abstractly. Because the problems encountered by large 
organizations—here, stove piping and information leakages—are 
diﬃ  cult to replicate in a small-group setting, special design elements 
and artiﬁ cial constraints on communication were imposed. After 
dividing student participants into country teams, they were further 
divided into three country cells: the chief executive, the military, and 
the diplomatic corps (ﬁ gure 1). Each country cell was assigned to a 
separate room, forbidden from entering any other cell’s room, and 
allowed to record and deliver orders only using carbon copy paper. 
The executive and military teams were further restricted to permit-
ting only one cell member to leave the room at a time. Therefore, all 
diplomatic negotiations and interagency coordination had to take 
place in the public hallway, where it might be overheard. Coordi-
nation among country cells became diﬃ  cult, which created a real 
risk of subunits pursuing isolated agendas that failed to create a 
coherent team strategy. 
Our ﬁ nal objective was to introduce students to the realities of 
military planning, deployment, and civil–military relations. Although 
executive cells had the exclusive right to take action, any use of troops 
required extensive preplanning by the military cell. Executive cells 
could implement orders only for plans that their military cells had 
already ﬁ led with the control cell. Thus, military cells had to plan 
proactively—not only for their executive cell’s current strategy but 
also for contingency strategies as other players’ actions foiled their 
best-laid plans. This task was rendered even more diﬃ  cult by the 
requirement of conforming to deployment realities. Each military 
cell was given a large packet of information detailing its available 
units (table 1) and how long it takes each type of unit to mobilize, 
travel, and unload (table 2). Preprinted forms were used to prompt 
each military cell to provide the correct information (table 3); tutor-
ing by the control cell was necessary in the ﬁ rst few rounds because 
poor plans inevitably were submitted. 
THE SIMULATION
Logistics
CISS opened participation in the Pakistan Crisis Simulation 
to any student at Princeton University. Because the simulation 
was not embedded in a course or set of courses, we required no 
advanced preparation. Advertisements were placed in several 
campus outlets prior to the simulation and because participant 
counts and team assignments were needed in advance, partici-
pants were asked to sign up via e-mail. Beyond attracting a large 
group of highly motivated students, such open enrollment had 
the additional advantage of serving as a recruitment mechanism 
for students who otherwise might not take a political science or 
security studies course. We had approximately 45 participants: a 
combination of undergraduates, master’s degree students, and 
PhD candidates.
The simulation, which was held on a Saturday to accommodate 
as many students as possible, lasted approximately 8.5 hours. We 
dedicated the ﬁ rst hour to brieﬁ ng participants on the simulation’s 
rules, roles, and structure and to an initial team-planning session, 
in which the entire country team could meet together in a private 
room. Participants were given a prepared packet that included the 
simulation rules and scenario as well as a description of their country 
team’s interests and the speciﬁ c threats they were facing. Members of 
the military cells were given an additional packet that contained force 
structures and deployment timetables. A half-hour was allowed for 
a catered lunch break. The last hour was reserved for an extended 
debrieﬁ ng in which the control cell summarized how events had 
developed over the course of the day and then described the ﬁ nal 
outcome. A group discussion followed about what students had 
learned and how their acquired knowledge related to political sci-
ence concepts and real-world crisis management.
We required one large lecture hall in which to conduct the brief-
ing and debrieﬁ ng sessions—the control cell also operated from this 
space—and enough smaller classrooms to accommodate each country 
cell, as well as a “media room” in which to update team representa-
tives on developments. We provided each country cell with basic 
supplies, including pens, post-it notes, rulers, carbon copy paper, 
and stacks of any required forms. Each country cell and the control 
cell had a large map of Pakistan showing major roads, ports, cities, 
and other geographical features. The baseline costs of the simulation 
were minimal: supplies and facility fees totaled approximately $250. 
Beyond attracting a large group of highly motivated students, such open enrollment had the 
additional advantage of serving as a recruitment mechanism for students who otherwise might 
not take a political science or security studies course. 
F i g u r e  1
Simulation Structure
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Lunch and travel expenses for outside professional experts (whom 
we embedded in the country cells as advisors) totaled an additional 
$5,000, although both of these costs are optional.
The Basic Structure 
Participants were randomly divided into country teams represent-
ing the United States, India, and Pakistan. As previously discussed, 
each countryteam was then further divided into executive, mili-
tary, and diplomatic cells (see ﬁ gure 1). More country teams can 
be added (e.g., Russia or Iran) and the number of participants in 
each cell is ﬂ exible to accommodate variance in participation rates. 
A professional expert was embedded in each country cell to serve 
as an advisor to the participants as well as to provide a “ﬂ y-on-the-
wall” perspective to help us understand the learning processes and 
diﬃ  culties of the simulation.3 We also relied on a team of about 10 
student volunteers, both graduate and undergraduate, to run the 
control cell.4 
The six hours of simulation play was divided into 30-minute 
rounds followed by 15-minute “breaks” for the control cell to resolve 
the previous round’s set of orders and then brief 
participants in the media room. Teams could sub-
mit plans and orders at any time (but they would 
not be implemented until the end of each round), 
and they were encouraged to continue strategizing 
and planning during the breaks. Each 30-minute 
round represented 24 hours of “real-world” time: 
that is, round one began at noon on the ﬁ rst day 
of the crisis, round two at noon on the second 
day, and so on. This was vital for military plan-
ning purposes. 
Each country cell had a deﬁ ned set of responsibilities, as follows: 
•  Executive cells were charged with developing the primary goals 
and strategies for their country team, deciding which actions 
to take, and submitting oﬃ  cial orders to the control cell (see 
table 3). They were given tremendous latitude in the types of 
military actions they could order—from prestaging ground 
forces to holding parades to conducting aerial reconnaissance 
to carrying out top-secret special-forces missions—as long as 
they conformed to their actual military capabilities and imple-
mented only those plans already submitted to the control cell 
by their military. Executive cells also could implement non-
military actions without restriction, including holding press 
conferences, issuing condemnatory statements, and mobilizing 
human rights organizations.
•  Military cells were responsible for proactively developing plans 
in line with their country’s strategic goals and ﬁ ling copies 
with the control cell. This responsibility, by far, was the most 
procedurally diﬃ  cult. Not only did the military cells have 
to anticipate their country’s strategic needs; they also had 
Ta b l e  1
Excerpt from US Capabilities and Assets
LOCATION AFGHANISTAN (KABUL) OKINAWA HAWAII SAN DIEGO INDIAN OCEAN
Miles to Pakistani Border 150 3,000 9,000 7,500 100
Special Operations Teams 50 25 25 25 5
Infantry Divisions 2 1 1 2 0.1 (expeditionary)
Cargo Aircraft 100 100 25 200
Transport Helicopters 200 50 50 50 10
Ta b l e  2
Excerpt from Military Assets, Capabilities, and Movement Constraints
TYPE OF ASSET COMPOSITION CAPABILITY OR PURPOSE TIME TO MOBILIZE TIME TO TRAVEL TIME TO OFFLOAD
Special Operations Team -10 troops per team -Surveillance and targeting
-Direct action
-Can be inserted via air, land, or sea
None Foot: 5 mph
Vehicle: 20 mph
None
Infantry Company -200 troops
-4 platoons
-Lightly armed
(rifles, machine guns, and mortars)
3 hours Foot: 3 mph
Vehicle: 20 mph
3 hours
Infantry Battalion -1,000 troops
-5 companies
-Lightly armed
(rifles, machine, guns and mortars)
6 hours Foot: 3 mph
Vehicle: 20 mph
6 hours
Infantry Brigade -5,000 troops
-5 battalions
-Heavily armed (1 battalion artillery) 24 hours Foot: 3 mph
Vehicle: 10 mph
24 hours
Ta b l e  3
Sample Military Planning Order (India team)
Who Infantry platoon from Northern Kashmir
Where Border crossing near Pakistani town of Kasur
What/Why Setup checkpoint on the road at the border crossing to search vehicles
How Transport by vehicle from Northern Kashmir
When 3 hrs mobilization + 7.5 hrs travel (150 mi/20 mph) + 1 hr oﬄ  oad = 11.5 hrs
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to operationalize those strategies by calculating mobiliza-
tion, travel, and oﬀ -loading schedules in real time and then 
translating this information into game-play time (see table 3). 
Furthermore, included in the packet of information describing 
their own capabilities, military cells also received partial infor-
mation on the assets of other teams, which provided insight 
into their potential strategies. Military cells were encouraged 
to triplicate their plans (using the carbon copy paper): sub-
mitting one copy to the control cell, keeping one copy, and 
giving the third copy to their executive cell. Finally, military 
cells were allowed to submit reasonable intelligence requests 
to the control cell (which decided whether to respond).
•  Members of the diplomatic cells were the only participants 
allowed to negotiate with other country teams. Although it 
was a seemingly minor ability, this gave diplomats the power 
to achieve their country’s interests via cooperation or decep-
tion. They could make any agreement they so desired—but 
were forewarned that other countries, as well as their own, 
were free to ignore those agreements.
One of this structure’s most useful aspects is its ﬂ exibility; it can 
support virtually any crisis scenario. Therefore, the substantive con-
tent of the simulation can be modiﬁ ed to teach speciﬁ c concepts or 
to reﬂ ect current international events.
The Crisis Scenario
In the morning brieﬁ ng session, participants were told that the 
Pakistani judiciary had launched an investigation of Pakistan’s 
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency two weeks prior. In 
response, the ISI pressured the civilian government to obstruct the 
judiciary on national-security grounds. The fragile parliamentary 
coalition acquiesced, leading to widespread protests and the defec-
tion of several coalition parties as well as triggering the collapse of 
the civilian government. Protests then turned violent, fracturing 
along ethnic lines. Because of the increasing chaos, the Pakistani 
Army had staged a coup to restore order. During the struggle for 
power among factions of the oﬃ  cer corps, as-of-yet-unidentiﬁ ed 
extremists gained control over one or more nuclear warheads—like-
ly through known sympathizers in the ISI. The simulation begins 
with the news that intelligence sources suspect that the extremists 
will attempt to smuggle the warheads out of Pakistan and sell them 
to other terrorists.
This scenario compelled participants to balance competing stra-
tegic interests: namely, the need for country teams to cooperate to 
ﬁ nd the missing nuclear materials against each country’s desire 
to prevent others from exploiting the chaos. This had to happen 
while potentially leveraging the situation to achieve each country’s 
own long-standing interests in the region. To maximize incentives 
for cooperation, each country was given information about a real 
terrorist group that had targeted them in the past, that had ties to 
Pakistan, and that could gain control over the nuclear material. 
Thus, at least in the beginning, all three teams shared an equal 
interest in preventing the warheads from leaving Pakistan. At the 
same time, all participants were given background information 
(in their simulation packets) about each country’s long-term 
interests in the region and their resulting potential to exploit the 
situation. 
EVALUATION
Outcome
After approximately six rounds of play, the simulation ended with 
two major developments. First, a combined task force of special-
operations units from all three countries successfully located and 
intercepted the two warheads just as they were about to cross the 
Pakistani border. Second, India and China inadvertently started 
a war. By far, this unintended conﬂ ict was the most interesting 
and “teachable” outcome because it resulted from a combination 
of mutual mistrust (i.e., a security dilemma) and bureaucratic pro-
cesses gone awry (i.e., stove piping). Neither India nor China could 
reassure the other that they would not use the crisis to redress their 
long-standing border dispute. Ultimately, both countries defen-
sively moved troops into the contested zone.
This action alone would not have led to conﬂ ict were it not for 
the bureaucracies run amok. By the midpoint of the simulation 
exercise, the military cells of both India and China became adept 
at rapidly churning out military plans because both felt quantity 
would best meet future changes in strategy. They also began building 
contingency into their orders in the form of if-then statements: for 
example, if the troops encounter no resistance when they arrive at 
point Z, then they start patrolling, but if they encounter an enemy 
unit, then they ﬁ re. In terms of bureaucratic eﬃ  ciency, this approach 
worked extremely well. Military cells could cover multiple potential 
scenarios in a single planning document and preplan for a vast range 
of strategic needs. In terms of eﬃ  cacy, it was a complete disaster. 
The sheer volume of military planning overwhelmed the executive 
cells, which began skimming their copies of the military plans. In 
the last round, the executive cells of both China and India thought 
they had merely ordered troops into the border zone. However, 
those orders contained if-then statements that required them to 
engage if they encountered foreign troops. When both countries 
moved units into the same geographical space—that is, when they 
made contact with one another—they automatically began a ﬁ re-
ﬁ ght. The initial bloodshed activated other contingency plans that, 
in turn, led to an inadvertent war. Thus, a mutual attempt to deter 
war ultimately caused one.
Beneﬁ ts
We found that this unique model for crisis simulation has three 
major strengths. First and most important, it is an eﬀ ective way to 
teach students about the dynamic nature of strategic interactions 
and the inexorable link between strategy and process. Students 
had to develop strategy in a rapidly changing environment, with 
limited information and often unpredictable allies and adversar-
ies. The model also demonstrated that strategy without process is 
pointless, whereas process without strategy is dangerous.
One of this structure’s most useful aspects is its ﬂ exibility; it can support virtually any crisis sce-
nario. Therefore, the substantive content of the simulation can be modiﬁ ed to teach speciﬁ c con-
cepts or to reﬂ ect current international events.
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Second, the simulation model is adaptable and relatively easy 
to emulate. The basic rules can be adjusted to emphasize diﬀ erent 
concepts and the content can be modiﬁ ed to reﬂ ect student inter-
ests and unfolding, real-world crises. Country teams can be added 
to accommodate more participants or diplomacy cells can be elimi-
nated for smaller groups. The simulation can be incorporated into 
an introductory international relations or security studies course 
or implemented as a joint activity among smaller classes across 
subﬁ elds, with country-cell composition corresponding to substantive 
areas. The simulation also can be conducted as an extracurricular, 
department-wide activity or—as in our case—as part of the yearly 
programmatic activities of a center or institute. 
Finally, the crisis-simulation format appealed to a much broader 
audience than a traditional security studies course. We clearly 
advertised that the simulation would develop skills useful in law 
and business as well as in politics and security; students who 
had never taken a political science course signed up (i.e., sev-
eral ﬁ nance and economics majors). Students also reported that 
a one-day simulation was a low-cost way for them to “try out” 
security studies. The crisis simulation thus allowed us to teach 
strategic thinking to a broad, interdisciplinary audience while also 
recruiting future students into the discipline.
Challenges
Moving forward, we are interested in developing a post-simulation 
assessment tool beyond the debrieﬁ ng discussions. Indeed, incorpo-
rating this simulation into regular classes would require developing 
metrics to assess individual or team performance. This presents a 
challenging dilemma: in constructing a scoring system for perfor-
mance, there is a risk incentivizing students to “game the game” 
rather than focus on the strategic processes at the crux of the simula-
tion. In other words, grade-based assessment could undermine the 
pedagogical goals of the exercise. Ideally, we would want to score 
both the understanding of key concepts and the degree to which 
teams “acted strategically.” The former could be achieved through 
a post-simulation quiz or survey, potentially taken weeks later to 
assess long-term learning. The latter, however, would require bas-
ing the evaluation on eﬀ ectively deriving strategies that matched 
means to ends, conditional on the actions of other teams. It is a 
diﬃ  cult task that we have yet to achieve.
We also encountered an unexpected challenge in repeating the 
crisis simulation because we opened participation to all students. 
Approximately 50% of participants in the second iteration of the sim-
ulation had participated in the Pakistan Crisis Simulation. Because 
of the knowledge they had gained and their mastery of the rules, 
the repeat players tended to dominate their teams, leading to feel-
ings of marginalization among some new players. Moving forward, 
we think the best solution is to organize two diﬀ erent simula-
tions that occur around the same time: one for new and one for 
repeat participants.
Finally, we want to ﬁ nd better ways to incorporate technology 
into future simulations. Students repeatedly noted the absence of 
the Internet and remarked that incorporating information tech-
nology would make the simulation seem more realistic. Social 
networking and cyber warfare also represent new ways to compete 
and cooperate strategically, and it would be interesting to see 
how they aﬀ ected simulation learning and outcomes. However, 
we also are concerned that allowing students to use these tech-
nologies would undermine the artiﬁ cial communication con-
straints we designed to simulate the struggles and irrationalities 
of large bureaucracies. ?
N O T E S
1. See, e.g., DeNeve and Heppner 1997; Fox and Ronkowski 1997; Kolb 1984; 
Loggins 2009; Major and Palmer 2001; McCarthy and Anderson 2000; and 
Zaino and Mulligan 2009.
2. More information about CISS and SEI is available at www.princeton.edu/ciss.
3. We incorporated 13 professionals into the country teams, including mid-career 
military oﬃ  cers from the Marine Corps Command and Staﬀ  College, West 
Point, and McGuire Air Force Base; representatives from several intelligence 
agencies; a former United Nations staﬀ er; a Council on Foreign Relations 
fellow; and two corporate risk analysts.
4. As the chief designers of the simulation, we ran general logistics and managed 
the control cell. One or two student volunteers assumed each of the following 
tasks: tracking the materials and orders of an individual country team; updat-
ing the master map of troop deployments and other important geographically 
based actions; determining the actions of terrorists and other important actors 
and states not represented by the country teams; collecting orders and plans; 
and providing general logistical assistance. The entire control cell assisted with 
resolving orders at the end of each round.
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